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Mental Illness, Severe Emotional
Distress, and the Death Penalty:
Reflections on the Tragic Case of
Joe Giarratano
Richard J. Bonnie ∗

∗ Editor’s Note: Professor Bonnie became involved in Joe Giarratano’s
case in 1979. After a bench trial in which the trial judge rejected an insanity
plea, the court ordered Giarratano to undergo a psychiatric examination at the
Forensic Psychiatry Clinic at the University of Virginia for possible use at the
capital sentencing proceeding. Professor Bonnie observed the clinical evaluation
and consulted with the Clinic staff as they developed their opinions and wrote
the Clinic’s report. Because Giarratano had confessed to the killings, had been
convicted of committing them, and did not deny his guilt, the evaluators
assumed he was guilty and focused entirely on possible mitigating factors,
including whether Giarratano had experienced emotional disturbance and
impaired volitional capacity at the time of the offenses.
After Giarratano was sentenced to death and the Virginia Supreme Court had
affirmed the conviction and sentence, Giarratano declined to seek any further
judicial review. As the execution date neared, Professor Bonnie went to see
Giarratano at the request of anti-death penalty advocacy groups. Concluding
that Giarratano was acutely distressed and possibly psychotic, Professor Bonnie
attempted to persuade him to authorize the initiation of post-conviction
proceedings while efforts were also undertaken to obtain psychiatric treatment
for him. Giarratano equivocated, but eventually authorized Professor Bonnie
and co-counsel to seek a stay and file a state habeas petition.
For several years, Giarratano vacillated about whether he wanted to
terminate the proceedings as they moved unsuccessfully through state courts
and thereafter in the federal district court. A central claim of the federal
petition was that Giarratano had not been competent to assist counsel in
connection with the sentencing proceedings. The district court denied relief on
this claim in 1986. Over the years of 1986 and 1987, however, the entire
narrative of the case changed as newly discovered evidence raised serious
doubts about whether Giarratano had actually committed the murders. At that
point, with Giarratano’s unequivocal support, the federal habeas petition was
amended to extend the competency claim to the guilt phase of the trial.
After the Fourth Circuit denied relief, Professor Bonnie participated in
drafting and advocating the successful petition for a conditional pardon and has
also written in support of Giarratano’s requests for parole which has thus far
proven fruitless.
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Abstract

Joe Giarratano was on death row for twelve years, and
remains incarcerated today, because mental illness and severe
emotional distress wholly undermined reliable adjudication in his
case. Using Giarratano’s remarkable story as a case study, I
illustrate some of the ways in which mental illness and acute
emotional distress can lead to unreliable findings and judgments
and—even worse—can actually propel the criminal justice system
toward a death sentence. I cover the unreliability of his confession,
his impaired ability to assist counsel, his impaired capacity to
make a rational decision regarding whether to initiate or continue
post-conviction proceedings, his diminished mental responsibility
at the time of the alleged offenses if he actually committed them,
and an issue that fortunately never arose—his competence to be
executed.
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I. Introduction
Mental disability can undermine the reliability and fairness
of capital adjudication at every stage of the process, from the
defendant’s very first interaction with law enforcement to the
waning minutes before a scheduled execution. 1 Giarratano’s case
1.

See generally Rodney J. Uphoff, The Role of the Criminal Defense
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illustrates many of these problems, ranging from his unreliable
confessions during police interrogation to his impaired decisional
capacity while on death row. 2
A cardinal principle of Eighth Amendment death penalty
jurisprudence is the heightened need for reliability in the
determination that a defendant is guilty of a capital offense and
that imposition of the penalty of death is legally authorized and
morally warranted in the defendant’s particular case. 3 In Atkins
v. Virginia, 4 the Supreme Court precluded capital punishment for
defendants with intellectual disability, noting the many ways in
which intellectual disability can undermine the reliability of
capital adjudication:
The risk “that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of
factors which may call for a less severe penalty,” Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U. S. 586, 605 (1978), is enhanced [in cases involving
defendants with intellectual disability], not only by the
possibility of false confessions, but also by the lesser ability of
mentally retarded defendants to make a persuasive showing of
mitigation in the face of prosecutorial evidence of one or more
aggravating factors. Mentally retarded defendants may be less
able to give meaningful assistance to their counsel and are
typically poor witnesses, and their demeanor may create an
unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their
crimes. . . . [M]oreover, reliance on mental retardation as a
mitigating factor can be a two-edged sword that may enhance
the likelihood that the aggravating factor of future
dangerousness will be found by the [judge or] jury. Mentally

Lawyer in Representing the Mentally Impaired Defendant: Zealous Advocate, or
Officer of the Court?, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 65 (1988) (discussing the challenges of
representing mentally ill defendants); Bruce J. Winick, The Supreme Court’s
Evolving Death Penalty Jurisprudence: Severe Mental Illness as the Next
Frontier, 50 B.C. L. REV. 785 (2009) (discussing the legal issues surrounding
mentally ill defendants and capital punishment, including blameworthiness,
jury determinations, and competence for trial).
2. See infra Parts II & IV (exploring the reliability of a defendant’s
confessions and a defendant’s competence to make decisions about postconviction relief).
3. See, e.g., California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998–99 (1983) (“[T]he
qualitative difference of death from all other punishments requires a
correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing
determination.”).
4. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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retarded defendants in the aggregate face a special risk of
wrongful execution. 5

Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s firm declaration in
Atkins, Professor David Bruck has shown that our system has
failed, in practice, to prevent the execution of defendants who
have been diagnosed as having an intellectual disability. 6 Our
system also had virtually no impact on the much larger number
of cases in which intellectual impairments can impede reliable
adjudications, including those impairments that fall short of a
diagnosis of intellectual disability. 7
Fortunately, Joe Giarratano has a first-class intellect and a
sterling character. He was on death row for twelve years and
remains incarcerated today, however, because mental illness and
severe emotional distress wholly undermined reliable
adjudication in his case. 8 Using Giarratano’s remarkable story as
a case study, I illustrate some of the ways in which mental illness
and acute emotional distress can lead to unreliable findings and
judgments and, even worse, can actually propel the criminal
justice system toward a death sentence. 9 I address the
unreliability of Giarratano’s confession, 10 his impaired ability to
assist counsel, 11 his impaired capacity to make a rational decision
regarding whether to initiate or continue post-conviction
proceedings, 12 his diminished mental responsibility at the time of

5. Id. at 320–21.
6. See Professor David Bruck, Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse Clinic
Director at Wash. & Lee U. Sch. of L., Panel Discussion at the Washington and
Lee University School of Law Lara D. Gass Annual Symposium: From
Conviction to Clemency: Commonwealth v. Giarratano, A Case Study in the
Modern Death Penalty (Feb. 6, 2016) (discussing the use of capital punishment
for individuals with mental illness and intellectual disability).
7. See generally id.
8. See infra notes 32–34 and accompanying text (discussing Giarratano’s
mental health issues at the time of his trial).
9. See infra Parts II–VI (examining various issues related to the mental
capacity of death penalty defendants).
10. See infra Part II (discussing the reliability of confessions).
11. See infra Part III (considering the consequences in a death penalty case
when a defendant is unable to assist counsel).
12. See infra Part IV (exploring whether a defendant has competence to
seek or terminate post-conviction relief).
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the alleged offenses if he actually committed them, 13 and an issue
that fortunately never arose—his competence to be executed. 14
II. Reliability of Confessions
The first problem with the reliability of confessions is the
risk of a false confession. Although Giarratano appears to have no
memory of having committed these crimes, he reached the
conclusion that he was responsible upon waking up in the
apartment and seeing the victims’ bodies. 15 By convincing
himself of his culpability, Giarratano undermined all the rules
and safeguards that our system provides to prevent conviction of
the innocent. Perhaps the most important of these safeguards is
the requirement that the prosecution bear the heavy burden of
proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 16
Giarratano relieved the police of the burden of investigating the
case and relieved the prosecution of the burden of proving his
guilt. 17 This problem infected everything that followed—the
police made no effort to corroborate the confession(s) or even to
resolve inconsistencies among them. 18 Giarratano was
13. See infra Part V (examining the challenges associated with diminished
responsibility).
14. See infra Part VI (describing the impact such a consideration might
have had in Giarratano’s case).
15. See Giarratano v. Procunier, 891 F.3d 483, 486 (4th Cir. 1989) (quoting
Giarratano’s affidavit in which he stated “I do not know whether I murdered
Toni and Michelle or not. Since the night I woke up in their apartment, I have
always assumed, convinced myself I was guilty; but, I never had any actual
memory of committing the murders”).
16. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977) (“[T]he Due
Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all
of the elements included in the definition of the offense of which the defendant
is charged.”).
17. See Procunier, 891 F.3d at 485 (explaining that Giarratano confessed to
the crime on multiple occasions).
18. See Giarratano v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1064, 1067–69 (1980)
(detailing the content of Giarratano’s multiple confessions); see also In re Joseph
M. Giarratano: Petition for Conditional Pardon by the Governor of the
Commonwealth of Virginia, at 30–31 (1991) [hereinafter Giarratano Petition for
Conditional Pardon] (describing inconsistencies in Giarratano’s various
confessions).

1450

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1445 (2016)

unmotivated to defend himself and therefore made no effort to
assist counsel. 19 Indeed, his indifference to defending himself and
his desire for the death penalty undermined his lawyer’s
motivation to defend him and, pretty clearly, his lawyer’s efforts
to do so. 20 No one, including Giarratano or his lawyer, made the
police and prosecution do their jobs. Moreover, in the effort to
identify possible mitigating claims focused on his mental state at
the time of the offenses, the Forensic Psychiatry Clinic staff
invited Giarratano to speculate about why he might have
committed crimes that he had such a questionable recollection for
having committed, and the resulting speculation made its way
into the judge’s sentencing memorandum. 21
The impact of the unreliable confession did not end with the
conviction and sentence. It also infected the post-conviction
proceedings. Habeas representation was entirely a pro bono effort
at that time and it did not occur to habeas counsel, including me,
to question Giarratano’s guilt or to review the evidence bearing
on the conviction. As for the sentence, the Forensic Clinic staff
had developed a fairly detailed social history and psychological
formulation that was itself rare in the early days of post-1976
capital representation. 22 The findings of that report supported a
compelling case in mitigation based on diminished mental and
emotional capacity. Given the trial record, the state habeas
petition did not question the legality of the conviction. 23 Instead it
challenged the constitutionality of the “future dangerousness”
predicate in the capital sentencing statutes on its face and as
applied in Giarratano’s case, objected to constitutional errors
19. See Giarratano Petition for Conditional Pardon, supra note 18, at 2
(“He refused to defend himself. In his mind he was guilty and deserved to die.
He tried to take his own life several times before trial. Failing that, he
orchestrated his defense to assure his death. He refused to plead guilty in
exchange for a life sentence.”).
20. See id. at 64 (explaining that because Giarratano was so convinced of
his own guilt, “his attorney simply assumed that Mr. Giarratano was guilty”).
21. See Giarratano, 220 Va. at 1077 (discussing the Forensic Psychiatry
Clinic’s testimony about Giarratano’s “symbolic” reasons for committing the
crime).
22. See id. at 1075–78 (describing the social history the Forensic Psychiatry
Clinic compiled).
23. See Giarratano v. Procunier, 891 F.2d 483, 485 (4th Cir. 1989)
(describing the claims raised in Giarratano’s state habeas petition).
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relating to the use of psychiatric testimony to prove
dangerousness, and alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. 24 A
key contribution of the state habeas proceedings, however, was
the testimony of Giarratano’s trial counsel, who depicted the
struggles he confronted in coping with Giarratano’s
uncooperative and self-defeating behavior, including Giarratano’s
letter to the trial judge requesting a death sentence and his
opposition to filing a direct appeal. 25 Giarratano’s emotional
insistence on execution for his evil deeds was obviously more
intense than we had realized. 26 As discussed below, these
realizations led us to develop a then-novel theory that
Giarratano was not emotionally able to assist his attorney or to
make rational decisions about the defense of the case. 27
In 1986, the reliability of Giarratano’s confession, and his
guilt, were called into doubt for the first time by newly discovered
evidence—evidence that could have been discovered from the
outset if any of us had been motivated to look for it and had had
the resources to do so. 28 The fact that the prosecution had not
revealed the existence of confessions that contradicted key
statements in the confession used in court, as well as the
discovery of evidence implicating other suspects, raised genuine
doubts about the conviction, thus leading to the filing of an
24. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2; see also Procunier, 891 F.2d at
485 (“The [state habeas] court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the
allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel . . . . [T]he state habeas court ruled
that Giarratano’s trial counsel afforded him competent representation.”).
25. See Giarratano v. Procunier, No. 83-185, at 12 (E.D. Va. June 25, 1986)
(“Giarratano’s self-destructive tendencies led to his August 16 letter to Judge
McNamara requesting the death penalty and to two subsequent letters to the
same judge asking that his execution date be advanced.”).
26. See Giarratano Petition for Conditional Pardon, supra note 10, at 38–39
(explaining that after discovering the bodies of Barbara and Michelle Kline,
Giarratano’s “belief in his guilt became entrenched, and as it did he came to see
himself as evil and as deserving to die”).
27. See Giarratano, No. 83-185, at 11–12 (describing Giarratano’s claims
that his mental state limited his ability “to provide his counsel with the
information he needed to effectively present a case in mitigation at the
sentencing hearing”).
28. See Giarratano Petition for Conditional Pardon, supra note 10, at 53–62
(describing inconsistencies between Giarratano’s confessions and physical
evidence and discussing evidence suggesting that someone else committed the
murders).
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amended federal habeas petition 29 and eventually to a successful
request for gubernatorial clemency. 30 Naturally I have wondered
whether we should have been more skeptical about the confession
from the outset. As already indicated, it was clear even then that
Giarratano’s ability to recall the events during the time period
before, during, and after the killings was severely impaired. 31
Indeed, Giarratano’s impaired memory was apparent to the
psychiatrist at Central State Hospital, 32 who had evaluated
Giarratano’s competence to stand trial when he attempted to
commit suicide in jail after his arrest. 33 The Central State
psychiatrist diagnosed Giarratano as having Korsakoff’s
Syndrome, a severe impairment of memory attributable to
organic brain damage associated with chronic alcohol and drug
intoxication. 34
In any event, the fact is that no one questioned the
reliability of Giarratano’s confession until eight years later. 35
Could this happen today? As Richard Leo 36 and Brandon
29. See Giarratano v. Procunier, 891 F.2d 483, 485 (4th Cir. 1989)
(describing the procedural history of Giarratano’s federal habeas appeal and
noting that Giarratano amended his petition to include a claim that he was
incompetent to participate in the sentencing proceeding).
30. See B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Virginia Governor Blocks Execution, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 20, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/02/20/us/virginia-governorblocks-an-execution.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2016) (describing the
circumstances that led to Governor Wilder’s decision to commute Giarratano’s
sentence) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
31. See Procunier, 891 F.3d at 486 (discussing Giarratano’s lack of memory
surrounding the murders).
32. See Giarratano v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1064, 1071 (1980) (noting
Dr. Ryans’s explanation for Giarratano’s memory loss surrounding the crimes).
33. See id. at 1069 (explaining that Giarratano’s “‘mental difficulties’
[warranted] emergency hospitalization at Central State Hospital”).
34. See id. at 1071 (discussing Dr. Ryans’s testimony that inconsistency in
Giarratano’s confessions was due to memory loss from drug abuse and that
individuals with that type of memory loss “can’t get it straight in their mind so
they confabulate . . . consistent with what we call a Korsakoff’s syndrome”).
35. See Giarratano v. Procunier, 891 F.2d 483, 487 (1989) (“[Giarratano]
alleged newly discovered evidence discrediting the facts proved by the
Commonwealth that corroborated his confession.”).
36. See Professor Richard Leo, Hamill Family Chair Professor of L. & Soc.
Psychol., U. of San Francisco Sch. of L., Panel Discussion at the Washington and
Lee University School of Law Lara D. Gass Annual Symposium: From
Conviction to Clemency: Commonwealth v. Giarratano, A Case Study in the
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Garrett 37 observed at this Symposium, the problem of unreliable
confessions is much more widely understood today and the
standard of practice for capital defense is much more demanding
than it was in 1979. 38 We expect more of trial counsel—and of
habeas counsel as well. Especially in a capital case, the properly
trained trial lawyer will scrutinize every item of prosecution
evidence and will put the State on notice that corroboration for a
confession is essential. 39 The existence of contradictory
confessions would likely have been revealed by adequate
discovery, and it would have made a huge difference if
Giarratano’s confession(s) had been recorded. To sum up my
point, Giarratano’s mental and emotional condition led him to
confess to crimes that he did not remember and may not have
committed. 40 Yet, despite the indicia of unreliability, the problem
was not noticed at trial or in an entire round of state and federal
habeas proceedings. 41
Modern Death Penalty (Feb. 5, 2016) (discussing capital punishment and actual
innocence claims).
37. See generally Brandon Garrett, Confession Contamination Revisited,
101 VA. L. REV. 395 (2015) (discussing false confessions that were contaminated
during interrogation and arguing that courts should investigate reliability
consistent with scientific research into the false confession phenomenon). See
also Professor Brandon Garrett, Justice Thurgood Marshall Professor of L., U. of
Va. Sch. of L., Panel Discussion at the Washington and Lee University School of
Law Lara D. Gass Annual Symposium: From Conviction to Clemency:
Commonwealth v. Giarratano, A Case Study in the Modern Death Penalty (Feb.
5, 2016) (discussing remedies for ineffective assistance of counsel claims).
38. See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 388 (2005) (discussing a
defense attorney’s duty to investigate aggravating evidence); Wiggins v. Smith,
539 U.S. 510, 523–24 (2003) (explaining that defense attorneys must attempt to
discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence as well as evidence to
rebut aggravating circumstances). See generally AM. BAR ASS’N, GUIDELINES FOR
THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY
CASES (rev. ed. Feb. 2003) [hereinafter GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT]
(providing recommendation for capital defense counsel from appointment
through post-conviction and clemency proceedings).
39. See Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 387 (“The duty to investigate exists
regardless of the accused’s admissions or statements to the lawyer of facts
constituting guilt or the accused’s desire to plead guilty.” (quoting STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-4.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2d ed. 1982 Supp.))).
40. See supra notes 31–34 and accompanying text (discussing Giarratano’s
memory and mental state at the time of the murders and the trial).
41. See supra notes 28 & 33 and accompanying text (discussing the
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III. Competence to Assist Counsel

Giarratano’s case presents a fairly common scenario in
capital homicide cases. He twice attempted to commit suicide in
jail after his arrest, thereby triggering an evaluation of his
competence to stand trial—as it virtually always does—even
before counsel had been notified. 42 He was also put on antipsychotics during the pretrial period. 43 In many of these cases,
the defendant is actively seeking a death sentence and, in others,
the defendant may feel that a death sentence is inevitable. 44
Either way, the defendant’s lack of motivation to assist counsel is
often accompanied by overt efforts to subvert counsel. 45 What
typically happens in these cases is that the defendant pleads
guilty (sometimes over counsel’s objection) and invites the judge
to impose the death penalty. 46 The tensions in the attorney-client
relationship are often invisible to everyone else except counsel.
That is effectively what happened in Giarratano’s case as we now
know that he essentially undermined counsel every step of the
way. He turned down a possible plea agreement and insisted on a
discovery of evidence calling the accuracy of Giarratano’s confessions into
question).
42. See Giarratano v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1064, 1069–70 (1980)
(describing the circumstances of Giarratano’s initial competency evaluation).
43. See Giarratano Petition for Conditional Pardon, supra note 10, at 15
(“From the day of his arrest, throughout his trial and for his first four years on
death row, Joe was administered Thorazine, at times up to 900 mg per day, and
other psychotropic drugs.”).
44. See Richard J. Bonnie, Symposium, Mentally Ill Prisoners on Death
Row: Unsolved Puzzles for Courts and Legislatures, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1169,
1189 (2005) [hereinafter Bonnie, Mentally Ill Prisoners] (explaining that
prisoners who are competent may opt for execution out of feelings of “guilt and
remorse,” a situation that is particularly problematic if those feelings “take[]
root immediately after the crime”).
45. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 392 (1993) (explaining that Moran
fired his attorneys and changed his pleas to guilty to avoid presenting
mitigating evidence).
46. See Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: Beyond
Dusky and Drope, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 539, 588 (1993) [hereinafter Bonnie, The
Competence of Criminal Defendants] (“Such defendants typically insist on
pleading guilty against counsel’s advice and instruct counsel to refrain from
introducing any evidence in mitigation, or like Richard Moran, they discharge
their attorneys and plead guilty while represented. These defendants also
frequently request sentences of death.”).
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bench trial. 47 He wrote to the judge asking for a death sentence. 48
He directed counsel not to appeal the conviction and sentence
(although counsel filed a pro forma appeal because he concluded
that he was required to do so). 49
Of what legal significance is this fairly common scenario? Is a
capital defendant who seeks a death sentence, and undermines
counsel’s efforts to defend him, incompetent to stand trial? The
books are replete with cases where these defendants are ruled to
be competent to stand trial. 50 The psychiatrist who examined
Giarratano at Central State after his suicide attempt found him
competent to stand trial because Giarratano understood the
charges and the proceedings against him, understood the role of
counsel, and was able to communicate coherently with his
attorney. 51 Furthermore, the Forensic Psychiatry Clinic staff
raised no doubts about his competence to stand trial. 52 Indeed, it
is clear that Giarratano appreciated his jeopardy and was not
experiencing delusions, disorganized thinking, or other cognitive
deficits that are usually the focus of assessments of competence to
stand trial. 53 Clearly he did not lack the ability to assist counsel
in the usual sense. 54
47. See Giarratano Petition for Conditional Pardon, supra note 18, at 2–3
(“He refused to plead guilty in exchange for a life sentence. Afraid that even an
unconditional guilty plea would result in a life sentence, he assured his
conviction by opting for a bench trial and asserting a defense that had no factual
support.”).
48. See id. at 3 (“Upon conviction, he asked that the judge sentence him to
death.”).
49. See id. at 15 (noting that Giarratano’s direct appeal took place in 1980).
50. See, e.g., Godinez, 509 U.S. at 392 (explaining that the trial court found
Moran competent to stand trial, to waive his right to an attorney, and to plead
guilty). See generally Richard J. Bonnie, The Dignity of the Condemned, 74 VA.
L. REV. 1363 (1988) [hereinafter Bonnie, The Dignity of the Condemned]
(discussing obligations of attorneys and courts when capital defendants elect to
be executed).
51. Giarratano v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1064, 1070 (1980).
52. See id. at 1076–77 (discussing evidence presented by the Forensic
Clinic).
53. See id. at 1070 (explaining that the Central State psychiatrist
concluded that Giarratano was “suffering from a ‘transitional disturbance of
adult life with anxiety manifestations’” and there was no evidence of “mental
illness or feeblemindedness”).
54. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (explaining that
the test for competency to stand trial is “whether he has sufficient present
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This issue is fundamentally about motivation. How should
the courts respond to lack of motivation to defend oneself? Does it
matter why the defendant isn’t motivated? We have all seen
obstreperous clients who create autonomy fights with counsel,
but capital cases raise the stakes qualitatively higher. 55 Is a
suicidal defendant competent to stand trial? A depressed
defendant? A defendant who believes he deserves to die? A
defendant who is traumatized by the homicidal encounter? There
was plenty of evidence in Giarratano’s case of acute emotional
distress but was he unable to assist counsel or did he choose not
to assist counsel? This is a complicated clinical question that
ultimately requires a value judgment. We concluded, based on
expert consultation, that his depressed mental state and nearpsychotic level of distress were attributable to psychopathological
factors beyond his control and that his emotional distress and
agitation became more intense as the proceedings neared a
climax—initially the trial itself and pronouncement of a death
sentence and then the prospect of execution. 56 It is likely that
active treatment with anti-depressants as well as psychotherapy
could have been effective in restoring Giarratano’s capacity to
exercise reasoned judgment, but no such treatment was
attempted. 57
We can easily see why courts might be reluctant to hold,
categorically, that depressed or distressed defendants are not
competent to proceed. Malingering could be a serious problem for
one thing, and, even if the depression is genuine, bringing the
criminal process to a halt while depressed defendants are being
treated on the basis of the diagnosis alone is probably not
sensible. The key issue is functional impairment of decisional
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding—and whether he has a rational and factual understanding of the
proceedings against him”).
55. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (“[T]he penalty of death
is different in kind from any other punishment imposed under our system of
criminal justice.”).
56. See Giarratano Petition for Conditional Pardon, supra note 18, at 71
(discussing Giarratano’s mental state during his trial and its impact on his
ability to participate in his defense).
57. See id. at 70–71 (noting that during federal habeas proceedings,
Giarratano’s mental health improved “as a result of intensive, sustained
therapy”).
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capacity. The question should be whether the defendant’s
emotional condition is symptomatic of a clinically diagnosable
disorder and is interfering materially with his ability to make a
rational, self-interested decision about the defense or disposition
of the case. 58 The typical contexts in which this problem arises
are cases in which the defendant insists on pleading guilty over
counsel’s objection, refuses to accept a plea agreement that would
preclude a death sentence, refuses to put on a case in mitigation
or otherwise contest a death sentence, or resolves the “autonomy
fight” with counsel by waiving his right to counsel and invoking
his right to represent himself under Faretta v. California. 59
Giarratano’s case highlights the importance of distinguishing
between a defendant’s abilities to understand the proceedings,
appreciate his jeopardy, and communicate rationally with
counsel, on the one hand, and his decisional capacity, on the
other. What Giarratano lacked was the capacity to make rational,
self-interested decisions. 60 I hasten to add that I am not saying
that every defendant who would prefer to be executed lacks
decisional capacity. I have taken the opposite position. 61
Attorneys must, however, undertake a capacity assessment. 62
I have seen enough of these cases to convince me that a
suicide attempt or other clinically significant symptoms of
depression should raise a red flag and invite ongoing assessments

58. See Bonnie, Mentally Ill Prisoners, supra note 44, at 1186–87
(discussing a defendant’s mental illness and ability to make decisions and work
with attorneys).
59. See 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975) (concluding that a defendant in a criminal
trial has a constitutional right to proceed without an attorney if he makes a
voluntary and intelligent choice to do so).
60. Representing Giarratano in his post-conviction proceedings informed
my scholarly writings on the subject of competence for criminal adjudication.
See the theory developed in Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal
Defendants: A Theoretical Reformulation, 10 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 291 (1992) and
further elaborated in The Competence of Criminal Defendants, supra note 46.
61. See Bonnie, The Dignity of the Condemned, supra note 50, at 1367 (“I
have refused, however to become involved in other cases in which a prisoner
whose competence was not in doubt similarly expressed a preference for
execution.”).
62. See GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT, supra note 38, at 4.1 & cmt.
(discussing the importance of evaluating a defendant’s mental state and
competence in capital trials).
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of a defendant’s competence for adjudication in capital cases. 63
Moreover, even if the defendant is regarded as competent for
adjudication, it does not follow that justice is well-served by
bringing the defendant to trial in this condition. The State should
not be in a hurry to bring defendants with suicidal wishes and
treatable depression to trial. Practice guidelines for capital
representation should also advise counsel how to recognize
symptoms of depression, how to respond to those symptoms—
especially to suicidal ideation and behavior—and how to
ameliorate possible adverse impact on the attorney-client
relationship and on client decision-making. 64
None of this was done in Giarratano’s case. As mentioned
above, we argued in post-conviction proceedings that Giarratano
had been incompetent to assist counsel during the pre-trial period
and that proceeding to adjudication under these circumstances
violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to effective
assistance of counsel and to a fair trial. 65 Unfortunately, the
claim never got any traction in the courts. 66 The degree of
Giarratano’s emotional distress and its impact on the
performance of trial counsel only became apparent in the state
habeas. The federal habeas petition, as amended in 1983, raised
the claim that Giarratano had been unable to assist counsel due
to his emotional condition. 67 Like the state petition, the federal
petition only challenged the death sentence and did not seek to
set aside the conviction. 68 Although, in retrospect, this was a
63. See Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants, supra note 46, at
575 (noting that various symptoms of mental illness and disorders, including
depression, “may impair a defendant’s capacity to weigh information in order to
make rational choices”).
64. See, e.g., GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT supra note 38, at 4.1.A.2
(“The defense team should contain at least one member qualified by training
and experience to screen individuals for the presence of mental or psychological
disorders or impairments.”).
65. Supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text (discussing the claims of
Giarratano’s habeas petition).
66. See Giarratano v. Procunier, 891 F.2d 483, 485 (4th Cir. 1989) (listing
the procedural postures of Giarratano’s various appeals).
67. See id. at 486 (discussing Giarratano’s competency claims and noting
that “‘the gravamen of his claims has always been that he lacked the capacity to
provide information to counsel that was necessary to construct his defense’”
(quoting Giarratano’s amended habeas petition)).
68. See id. at 484–85 (listing the claims in Giarratano’s appeal from the
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huge mistake, it seemed like a prudent move at the time. Why
invite the court to rule that Giarratano had been incompetent to
stand trial and to set aside a conviction that was not in doubt?
His mental and emotional disorder had driven him to seek the
death penalty and rendered him incapable of assisting counsel in
connection with the sentencing proceeding. 69 Granting the relief
we sought would not require a new trial, only a new sentencing
proceeding. While the case was still under consideration in the
district court, however, the newly discovered evidence discussed
earlier raised genuine doubt about the conviction and we then
sought to amend the petition to challenge the conviction as well.
In response to the State’s argument that procedural default
barred review of the validity of the conviction, we argued that the
seriousness of Giarratano’s disability had been completely
obscured by his unshakeable belief in his own guilt and the
failure of his counsel to seek assistance in dealing with his
obviously self-destructive client after the initial request for a
competence evaluation. 70 We contended that his lawyer was
ineffective for failing to raise the issue as the case proceeded and
that the judge also denied Giarratano due process by failing to
raise the issue sua sponte at the time of sentencing. The district
court denied relief on our competency claim as it pertained to the
sentence and denied leave to amend the petition to extend the
claim to the conviction due to procedural default. 71 The Fourth
Circuit affirmed the dismissal of both competency claims without
discussing our motivationally grounded decisional capacity claim,
deferring to the state trial court’s original finding that Giarratano
was competent to stand trial. 72
district court’s denial of habeas corpus, which focused on sentencing and
competency).
69. See supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text (discussing Giarratano’s
behavior during the trial).
70. See Procunier, 891 F.2d at 485–86 (discussing the claims Giarratano
raised in his federal appeal).
71. See id. at 486 (describing the procedural posture of Giarratano’s motion
to amend his petition in the district court).
72. See id. at 486–87 (rejecting Giarratano’s competency challenge and
affirming the district court). The procedural history of the post-conviction
litigation is summarized by Judge Butzner in the panel opinion. Id. at 485–86.
The deferential stance taken by the Fourth Circuit is typical of its approach to
death penalty cases in the post-Furman era.
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IV. Competence to Decide Whether to Seek or Terminate PostConviction Relief
I want to turn now to another issue that Giarratano’s case
raised—the proper response to concerns about the capacity of a
condemned prisoner to decide whether to seek or terminate postconviction relief. This problem is typically an extension of the
dynamic I just discussed in the pre-trial context. In many cases
where capital defendants attempt suicide, subvert their own
defense, and request a death sentence, the judge or jury obliges
and the defendant finds himself on death row. 73 With the passage
of time, however, many of these condemned prisoners change
their minds. 74 That very fact should be a sufficient reason for
trial courts to routinely assure treatment of depressed and
suicidal defendants, monitor their competence, and readily grant
continuances to enable counsel to establish and preserve a
trusting productive relationship.
Giarratano, however, did not change his mind. After the
Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed his conviction and death
sentence, his appointed attorney’s obligation expired. He had no
duty to file a certiorari petition in the U.S. Supreme Court and
none was filed. Nor did Giarratano seek representation to file a
state habeas. An execution date was set and the clock was
ticking. Several anti-death penalty advocacy groups took interest
and requested me to go and see him. That visit began a deeply
draining process. He initially said no to post-conviction
proceedings. I prepared a contingency plan to file a petition as
“next friend” on my own without his consent based on my own
judgment that he was not competent to make a rational selfinterested decision regarding whether or not to seek postconviction relief. Eventually we worked out a plan in which he
agreed to allow Lloyd Snook and me to file a petition for a stay
and post-conviction relief while we attempted to get him the
73. See, e.g., Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 392–93 (1993) (explaining
that after the defendant waived his right to counsel and pleaded guilty, “a threejudge court sentenced [him] to death”).
74. See Bonnie, Mentally Ill Prisoners, supra note 44, at 1188–89 (“It
should be emphasized, however, that many prisoners are likely to change their
minds (authorizing post-conviction proceedings) as a result of successful [mental
health] treatment.”).
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psychiatric attention he needed. What followed during the next
several years was an off-and-on process in which Giarratano
would direct us to pull the plug and Lloyd Snook and Marie
Deans would convince him to relent. Eventually, after newly
discovered evidence raised genuine doubt about Giarratano’s
guilt, Giarratano joined unequivocally in the effort to save his
life. 75
Much has been written on the ethical dilemmas faced by
counsel in cases where his or her clients seek to terminate postconviction proceedings and on the proper response of the legal
system when a condemned prisoner “volunteers” for execution,
seeking “state-assisted suicide.” 76 I will not attempt to summarize
that debate here. In a word, my view is that we should respect
the dignity of condemned prisoners to make their own decisions
about whether to abandon legally available opportunities to
overturn their death sentences as long as they are competent to
make rational self-interested decisions based on their own
values. 77 This view is reflected in the ABA’s Resolution on Mental
Disability and the Death Penalty and in the companion position
statements of the American Psychiatric Association and the
American Psychological Association. 78
75. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing the discovery of
new exculpatory evidence in Giarratano’s case).
76. See generally Bonnie, The Dignity of the Condemned, supra note 50
(analyzing problems of client autonomy to waive appeals against social interest
in capital punishment); John Blume, Killing the Willing: “Volunteers,” Suicide
and Competency, 103 MICH. L REV. 939 (2004) (analyzing similarities between
“volunteers” for execution and suicidal persons and identifying a standard to
ensure death row inmates do not use the death penalty as a form of suicide).
77. See Bonnie, The Dignity of the Condemned, supra note 50, at 1390–91
(discussing essential factors to examine when a prisoner “volunteers” for
execution).
78. See ABA Task Force on Mental Disability and the Death Penalty,
Recommendations and Report on the Death Penalty and Persons with Mental
Disabilities, 30 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 668, 673 (2006)
[hereinafter ABA Task Force] (“Any meaningful competence inquiry in this
context must focus not only on the prisoner’s understanding of the consequences
of the decision, but also on his or her reasons for wanting to surrender, and on
the rationality of the prisoner’s thinking and reasoning.”); see also Bonnie,
Mentally Ill Prisoners, supra note 44, at 1184 (“[R]espect for the dignity of the
defendant or condemned prisoner requires counsel to adhere to the wishes of a
competent client . . . .”).
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V. Diminished Responsibility and Proportionality

Joe Giarratano was the third person to be sentenced to death
in Virginia during the post-Furman79 era. How Virginia’s newly
structured capital sentencing statute would be interpreted and
administered remained unclear. One overarching question that
has still not been satisfactorily resolved relates to the basic moral
structure of capital sentencing and particularly to the
relationship
between
aggravating
and
mitigating
circumstances. 80
Having observed numerous capital sentencing evaluations at
the Forensic Psychiatry Clinic over the past forty years, I have
had an ongoing opportunity to reflect on the legal and moral
implications of the clinical narratives that emerge in these cases.
One recurrent question is whether the aggravating circumstances
will do all the work, completely marginalizing the mitigation
narratives that might be derived from childhood abuse and
deprivation, mental disability, situational pressures, or the
“diverse frailties of humankind.” 81 Specifically in connection with
mental disability, will jurors, judges, and appellate courts ever
allow compelling mitigating factors to override the momentum
toward the death penalty created by a narrowed list of capital
elements and a finding of “dangerousness” or “vileness”? 82 In
Virginia, as in most states, defendants have an opportunity to
demonstrate specified statutory mitigating circumstances
79. See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (finding that the
death penalty violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in a case where
an accidental gun discharge during a robbery resulted in a death penalty
sentence).
80. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4 (2016) (detailing aggravating and
mitigating circumstances for capital offenses in Virginia).
81. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
82. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(C)
The penalty of death shall not be imposed unless the Commonwealth
shall prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a probability
based upon evidence of the prior history of the defendant or of the
circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense of which he
is accused that he would commit criminal acts of violence that would
constitute a continuing serious threat to society, or that his conduct
in committing the offense was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible
or inhuman, in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or
aggravated battery to the victim.
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regarding mental illness, such as “extreme mental or emotional
disturbance” at the time of the offense or “the capacity of the
defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly
impaired.” 83 Many defense attorneys worry, however, that
evidence of mental illness will amount to a “double-edged sword”
so that mitigation is essentially warped into aggravation. 84 That
is exactly what happened in Giarratano’s case. The trial judge
found that both key factors regarding diminished mental
responsibility existed in Giarratano’s case, just as the clinic
report had stated. 85 Yet he nevertheless sentenced Giarratano to
death. 86 He also interpreted one of the factors in a way that
nullified its moral significance: by concluding that “by becoming
an habituate of drugs and alcohol one does not cloak himself with
immunity from penalty for his criminal acts,” 87 he ignored the
fact that Giarratano’s severe addiction—accompanied by its
resulting psychopathology and neuropathology—had its roots in
childhood when he was exposed to his mother’s habitual use of
drugs and became addicted to them at a very early age. 88 Nor was
Giarratano seeking “immunity from penalty for his criminal
acts.” 89 Giarratano’s compelling moral and legal claim was simply
that the death penalty would be disproportionate to his

83. Id. at § 19.2-264.4 (B).
84. For a more optimistic view of how supposedly “double-edged” evidence
gets litigated today in Virginia—with far more defense victories than in the
past—see Brandon Garrett, The Decline of the Virginia (and American) Death
Penalty, 105 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2017).
85. See Giarratano v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1064, 1078 (1980) (“The
court concludes that the evidence of emotional stress and reduced control, while
admissible by statute and carefully considered by the court, is not of such nature
as to mitigate the penalty in this case.” (quoting the trial judge at Giarratano’s
sentencing)).
86. Id. at 1066.
87. Id. (quoting the trial judge at Giarratano’s sentencing).
88. Id. at 1075 (“Testimony showed that the defendant . . . started using
drugs at age 11 and that for a number of years he has had a significant drugalcohol problem.”).
89. Id. at 1078.
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culpability. 90 Even if he committed the crime, as he claimed that
he had, he should not have received a death sentence. 91
The only way to prevent this pattern of disproportionate
capital sentencing, and to assure that compelling claims of
diminished mental responsibility are given adequate moral
weight, is (1) to make findings of these mitigating factors
preclusive and (2) to require aggressive judicial review of trial
court findings (by judges, not juries) that the evidence does not
meet the mitigating criteria. Unfortunately, that has not
happened in Virginia or most other states. This common
judicial failure to take seriously the moral importance of
proportionality in capital sentencing is one of the reasons the
Supreme Court has precluded the death penalty altogether for
adolescents and persons with intellectual disability. 92 Now, the
argument is being made that a finding of serious mental illness
should also preclude the death penalty. 93 In 2006, the American
Bar Association, American Psychiatric Association, and
American Psychological Association endorsed identical position
90. See id. (discussing Giarratano’s arguments that the sentence was
“arbitrary” and “disproportionate”).
91. See id. (“Defendant concludes that the reasonable and just sentence, if
the conviction is affirmed, is more properly life in the penitentiary than death.”).
92. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572–73 (2005) (explaining that the
nature of a brutal crime might “overpower mitigating arguments based on youth
as a matter of course, even where the juvenile offender’s objective immaturity,
vulnerability, and lack of true depravity should require a sentence less severe
than death”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320–21 (2002) (explaining that
intellectually disabled defendants “face a special risk of wrongful execution”
because they may not be able to “make a persuasive showing of mitigation in the
face of prosecutorial evidence of one or more aggravating factors”).
93. See Robert Batey, Categorical Bars to Execution: Civilizing the Death
Penalty, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1493, 1527 (2009) (arguing that the Supreme Court
should extend Atkins to offenders who suffered from severe mental illness at the
time they committed a capital offense); Lyn Entzeroth, The Challenge and
Dilemma of Charting a Course to Constitutionally Protect the Severely Mentally
Ill Capital Defendant From the Death Penalty, 44 AKRON L. REV. 529, 534 (2011)
(arguing that severe mental illness diminishes the “extreme culpability” the
Supreme Court requires for imposition of the death penalty); Winick, supra note
1, at 814 (“To the extent that mental illness produces effects that reduce
volitional control and blameworthiness to the same degree as mental
retardation and juvenile status, the imposition of the death penalty is
insufficiently related to the purposes of capital punishment to allow its
application consistent with the Eighth Amendment.”).
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statements favoring this view, 94 and legislation codifying this
principle is under consideration in many states, including
Virginia. 95
VI. Competence to Be Executed
The Eighth Amendment bars execution of a prisoner who
does not appreciate the nature of the punishment and the reasons
it is being imposed. 96 Fortunately this is an issue that did not
arise in Giarratano’s case. The only point to make about it here is
that it is unfortunately tied to the other issues that I have
addressed, not conceptually or doctrinally but empirically. If one
looks at the records of most prisoners whose attorneys argue that
they are not competent to be executed, they typically were
incompetent at earlier stages of the case. 97 Unlike Giarratano,
these defendants have typically had histories of severe mental
illness, often including repeated episodes of psychiatric
hospitalization. 98 The records frequently indicate that their
94. See ABA Task Force, supra note 78, at 668:
Defendants should not be executed or sentenced to death if, at the
time of the offense, they had a severe mental disorder or disability
that impaired their capacity to (a) appreciate the nature,
consequences or wrongfulness of their conduct, (b) to exercise rational
judgment in relation to conduct, or (c) to conform their conduct to the
requirements of the law.
See also generally Christopher Slobogin, Symposium, Mental Disorder as an
Exemption from the Death Penalty: The ABA-IRR Task Force Recommendations,
54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1133 (2005) (analyzing the Task Force’s recommendations
for a prohibition on executing offenders whose mental disability reduced their
culpability at the time of the offense).
95. See H.B. 794, 2016 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2016) (providing that
a defendant in a capital case who suffered from a severe mental illness at the
time of the offense is not eligible for the death penalty and establishing
procedures to determine the defendant’s mental status at the time of the
offense).
96. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 957 (2007) (discussing the
lower court’s conclusions and finding that they were too narrow in scope) (citing
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 417 (1986) (plurality opinion)).
97. See id. at 936–37 (describing Panetti’s severe mental illness prior to
committing the offense, as well as his behavior following the offense and conduct
at trial).
98. See id. at 936 (noting that Panetti had been hospitalized on multiple
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mental and emotional functioning was significantly impaired at
the time of the offense and that their capacity to assist in their
own defense was at best “borderline.” 99 Declaring the prisoner to
be incompetent for execution is sometimes the last opportunity to
rectify a moral error that was uncorrected at every previous stage
of the criminal process. 100
VII. Conclusion
Joe Giarratano deserves to be celebrated for his courage and
many good deeds over the course of his imprisonment. 101 It is
time for the Commonwealth of Virginia to give him the
opportunity to become a free man. I have chosen to pay tribute to
Giarratano by using his case to illustrate the many ways in which
a defendant’s serious mental illness and emotional distress can
compromise the integrity of capital adjudication. In the absence
of abolition, the preferred remedy for most of these deficiencies is
to embrace prophylactic rules and safeguards to reduce the risk of
unreliable outcomes, 102 but I suspect that most of the participants
in this Symposium are doubtful that such an approach can
succeed. After all, we have had forty years to ascertain whether
occasions, and, at one time, was convinced the devil had possessed his home).
99. See id. (“During his trial, petitioner engaged in behavior later described
by his standby counsel as ‘bizarre,’ ‘scary,’ and ‘trance-like.’ According to the
attorney, petitioner’s behavior both in private and in front of the jury made it
evident that he was suffering from ‘mental incompetence.’”); see also Richard J.
Bonnie, Panetti v. Quarterman: Mental Illness, the Death Penalty, and Human
Dignity, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 257, 261 (2007) [hereinafter Bonnie, Panetti v.
Quarterman] (providing a summary of Panetti’s behavior during his trial).
100. See Bonnie, Panetti v. Quarterman, supra note 99, at 281–82 (arguing
that prisoners who bring claims challenging their competence to be executed
likely have a history of serious mental disorders and that fabricating
competence claims under those circumstances is rare).
101. See David Margolick, Legal Scholar on Death Row Fights to Halt Own
Execution, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1990, at A1 (“Mr. Giarratano has fashioned novel
legal arguments to broaden the constitutional rights of prisoners, notably their
right to counsel.”).
102. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts:
Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment,
109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 358 & n. 5–6 (1995) (discussing the argument that the
complexity of the procedure surrounding capital punishment delays executions
in lieu of abolition).
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the modern generation of capital sentencing statutes can be fairly
administered so as to reduce arbitrariness and assure a reliable
determination that death is morally appropriate for each
defendant sentenced to die. 103 In Giarratano’s case, a death
sentence was not the morally appropriate sentence and the case
reveals multiple systemic failures. While some of these systemic
problems have been ameliorated over the past four decades, the
unvarnished truth is that human error is an ever-present risk in
criminal adjudication and an unacceptable one in capital
adjudication. In telling the story of Giarratano’s case, it has been
especially sobering for me to come face-to-face with errors of my
own.

103. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality
opinion) (“[I]n capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying
the Eighth Amendment . . . requires consideration of the character and record of
the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a
constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of
death.” (citation omitted)); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976)
(“[W]here discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the
determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that
discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of
wholly arbitrary and capricious action.”).

